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Abstract 
Cryptomarkets are online marketplaces, located on the darknet, that facilitate the trading of a variety of illegal goods, mostly drugs. While 
the literature essentially focused on drugs, various other goods and products related to financial or identity fraud, firearms or counterfeit 
goods, as well as doping products are also offered on these marketplaces. 
Through the analysis of relevant data collected on a popular marketplace in 2014-2015, Evolution, this research provides an analysis of the 
structure of trafficking (types and proportions of products, number of vendors, shipping countries). It also aims at highlighting geographical 
patterns in the trafficking of these products (e.g. trafficking flows, specialisation of vendors, role in the distribution chain). 
The analysis of the flow of goods between countries emphasises the role of specific countries in the international and domestic trafficking, 
potentially informing law enforcement agencies to target domestic mails or international posts from specific countries. The research also 
highlights the large proportion of licit and illicit drug listings and vendors on Evolution, followed by various fraud issues (in particular, 
financial fraud), the sharing of knowledge (tutorials) and finally goods, currencies and precious metals (principally luxury goods). Looking 
at the country of origin, there seems to be a clear division between digital and physical products, with more specific information for physical 
goods. This reveals that the spatial analysis of trafficking is particularly meaningful in the case of physical products (such as illicit drugs) 
and to a lesser extent for digital products. Finally, the geographical analysis reveals that spatial patterns on Evolution tend to reflect the 
structure of the traditional illicit market. However, regarding illicit drugs, country-specificity have been observed and are presented in this 
article. 
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1 Introduction 
The Internet continues to play an important role in illegal trafficking. It acts as a facilitator, providing another medium for 
sales and purchases, and a platform for information sharing between users. Users can access both legal and illegal commodities 
online from anywhere around the world [1]. Cryptomarkets, located on the darknet, are only the last illustration of the 
transition from illegal markets in the real world to the virtual world [2]. Visually very similar to popular merchant websites 
like eBay and Amazon, cryptomarkets share several structural features with conventional online sales sites. Lists of products 
and services offered by sellers are organised into categories and subcategories. Sellers - and their products - are evaluated 
according to the feedback left by their previous customers, trust and reputation being central components of the trade on 
cryptomarkets [3]. Unlike conventional sales sites, however, cryptomarkets facilitate exchanges in a context where the 
anonymity of administrators and participants is protected thanks to the combination of encryption features. They are the 
connections through relays to make them anonymous (using for instance the TOR - The Onion Router - browser) [4], the 
automatic encryption of all communications through PGP - Pretty Good Privacy - cryptography [5] and the payments with 
decentralised cryptocurrencies, mainly bitcoins [6].  
Considering the perpetual evolution of crime and the importance of the Internet in illicit activities, analysing any illicit market 
should rely on a more holistic approach and take into account the physical (i.e. traditional trafficking) as well as the virtual 
(i.e. online trafficking) dimensions of the market. This analysis would enable a deeper understanding of the structure of 
criminal groups online and potentially draw the link between the virtual world and the physical world which is not currently 
known. Furthermore, analysing cryptomarkets represents an interesting approach to inform on trends and dynamics that may 
affect the offline market. A geographical analysis would also fuel hypotheses to better understand the role of cryptomarkets 
as a new distribution channel, as sellers can source as well as sell drugs online. Sellers may also move their trade to sell all or 
part of their merchandise while producers may decide to eliminate certain intermediaries and sell directly to consumers [7]. 
Combining geographical analysis to general knowledge about the traditional market might highlight the presence of new 
actors (e.g. producers or retailers) and clarify the role played by cryptomarkets in the distribution chain. In addition, from a 
country-specific perspective, trends regarding different categories of product might be detected, and eventually monitored, 
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from both demand and supply points of view. Despite the added value of a geographical analysis, only a few studies provide 
a country-specific perspective and they are focused on drugs trafficking and the darknet market named Agora [8,9]. 
Differences in the availability of specific substances among shipping countries were observed by these research works. It was 
concluded that spatial specificity can be due to different factors affecting countries differently, such as geographic isolation, 
stringent border controls, relaxed laws in regards to illicit goods, high prices of goods, strict control of internet access, 
proximity to producing countries, domestic productions of goods and relative availability of illicit goods [8]. Most research 
on cryptomarkets has focussed on drugs to evaluate the structure of the market [2,10,11], characteristics of vendors [12–14], 
consumers/users’ demand [15,16], the investigation of sales volume [11], vendors’ activity [17], wholesale vs. retail [18] and 
the coherence between digital and physical information [19]. In a few words, literature shows that cryptomarkets are 
dominated by English-speaking countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia) and Western European countries 
(in particular, the Netherlands) and the main offered and purchased illicit drugs are cannabis, stimulants (cocaine and 
amphetamines), ecstasy (MDMA) and psychedelics (NPS, LSD) [8,10,16,20].  
Although drugs are offered and sold prolifically online; various illegal services and products related to financial or identity 
fraud as well as counterfeit goods are also offered on the cryptomarkets. To our knowledge, no information is available on 
the proportions these categories represent on darknet markets. In this context, this study will provide information on the types 
and frequencies of all the products offered on the cryptomarket Evolution. Geographic information will also be analysed to 
highlight specific patterns in the trafficking of certain substances or goods and reveal specificities of the illicit market for a 
particular country (e.g. the specialisation in the distribution of certain types of products). Such analysis will provide a 
comparison of the distribution of physical and digital products and help to explain the relation between the origin country and 
the type of product. In most studies, only the origin country is analysed. Here, a combined analysis of shipping countries and 
destinations will be performed to highlight trafficking flows and therefore evaluate the trafficking nature from certain 
countries (i.e. domestic vs. international). Lastly, the structure of illicit drugs trafficking as well as its geographic distribution 
will be investigated. The results will be confronted to knowledge regarding the traditional market to assess the relationship 
between the online and offline markets. The NPS will be specifically studied to evaluate which countries are at the forefront 
of the trafficking and even their role in the distribution chain. This specific example will indicate how the online trade reflect 
knowledge regarding the traditional trafficking. 
2 Dataset and methodology 
The cryptomarket Evolution was studied since it was a popular cryptomarket during its period of activity, from January to 
March 20151. In particular, it was very attractive to users since it survived “Operation Onymous” in late 2014 [21]. The dataset 
used in this study is a compilation of source codes collected, gathered and released by an independent researcher named 
Gwern Brawnen2. He performed data collection over 115 days between January 2014 and March 2015. Although the data is 
not exhaustive as the crawling was not conducted every day and the pages that presented an error were not downloaded, the 
crawls were frequent enough (weekly) and millions of pages were downloaded by the researcher [22]. As a consequence, the 
dataset used in this study can be considered representative for the purpose of the research.  
This dataset has already been used in a previous research in ord er to provide an overview of Evolution in an attempt to test 
the reliability of vendors’ listings by purchasing illicit drugs and analysing them [19]. The present research is not only focused 
on drugs related listings but on all goods offered on Evolution. Each listing of every category was parsed by the authors 
through a Python script to extract its title, price and classification within the cryptomarket, as well as the vendor pseudonym 
and the geographical information - i.e. the mentioned shipping country and destination(s). Vendor username was used to 
evaluate the total number of vendors present on a cryptomarket as well as the product category where vendors were the most 
present [11,17]. Trafficking flows between countries were also obtained using country of origin and destination country. 
Section 3.5 deals with the evaluation of the role of countries within the distribution chain of NPS. For this purpose, the quantity 
and price of the offered products were investigated for each listing. All information was structured to allow further analysis 
and to accurately study the trafficking structure on Evolution. A new classification of listings was carried out. Indeed, the 
overview of the worldwide market would otherwise be uncertain and specific patterns (predominance of a product category, 
specific spatial distribution, etc.) could also be unclear or even hidden (see Appendix 1 for details about the new classification 
we performed), as also observed by other researchers [8,9,18,22].  
Data analysis was performed using R [23], RStudio v. 1.0.136, Tableau Software Professional Edition v. 9.3 and Microsoft 
 
 
1 It is assumed that the administrators of Evolution “exit scammed” (DeepDotWeb, 2015) 
2 Data available on the Reddit page https://reddit.com/2zllmv 
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Excel v. 15.31. Trafficking flows (section 3.3) were represented as chord diagrams using the R library circlize3. Only for this 
particular analysis, listings with unstated shipping destinations were removed (n = 40,851).  
 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Products offered 
The extraction of each listing source code for every crawling date led to the identification of 92,980 unique sale proposals, 
after discarding six listings that stated unclear shipping country information. A total number of 4,171 distinct vendor 
usernames was detected. Results show that a vendor may manage one or more listings (min = one listing, max = 1,441, median 
= 9, mean = 22, standard deviation = 49). Most of the sale proposals (63%) concern licit or illicit drugs and paraphernalia, in 
particular, illicit drugs (close to 50% of all listings), as illustrated in Table 1 below. This is also the sub-category where 
vendors are the most present (close to 60% of vendors offer at least one product classified as illicit drug). Specific trends 
concerning the distribution of illicit drugs will be discussed in the section 3.5. This category also includes prescription drugs 
and medicines (mainly benzodiazepines - 34% and synthetic opioids - 31%), performance and image enhancing drugs (PIEDs, 
mainly steroids) as well as, to a lesser extent, laboratory supplies and paraphernalia. Listings related to various fraud issues 
represent almost a third of the total number of listings and close to half of vendors propose products classified in this category. 
Several activities and services related to carding4 are particularly covered (listings classified as carding represent close to 70% 
of the listings grouped in “Fraud Related”). Goods with a high probability of forgeries are mainly concerned in the third 
category “Goods, currencies and precious metals”. Indeed, luxury goods (essentially watches - 89%) and clothes and 
accessories (glasses - 21%, bags - 18% and shirts - 14%) represent about 60% of the sale proposals in this category. 
Interestingly, only a few vendors offer goods in these two categories. The “ID Related” category includes sale proposals 
related to ID theft (37%), various types of licences and legitimation documents such as bank statements or university diplomas 
(35%) and IDs (28%). ID theft mainly consists in “fullz”, as advertised by vendors, that are archives containing financial 
information (bank account logins or credit card numbers) and personal information (name, address, e-mail, security social 
number, date of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.). According to the listing titles, the IDs subcategory includes scans of ID 
cards or passports, editable graphical material as well as genuine or forged IDs. Lastly, about 1,000 listings were classified as 
“Firearms & Weapons” in which a third of sale proposals concerns firearms. 
 
 
 
3 https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/circlize/index.html 
4 Carding concerns the acquisition (through skimmers at ATMs or hacking an e-commerce, for instance) and 
resale  of credit cards and bank accounts as well as related activities such as money laundering (e.g. money transfer 
using bitcoins, money transfer companies or acquisition of prepaid cards) or reshipping services through mules. 
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Table 1. Listings’ and vendors’ proportions for the different categories of products. Listing/Vendor percentages are 
calculated as the ratio between the respective number of listings/vendors for each product main categories and the 
respective total number of listings/vendors in the whole market (n = 92,980 listings and 4,171 vendors). 
* : Since a same vendor account may manage listings classified in different (sub-)categories, the number of vendors may be 
higher than the total number of vendors calculated according to their usernames. 
✭ : Listing/Vendor percentages of subcategories are calculated as the ratio between the respective number of 
listings/vendors for each subcategory and the total number of listings/vendors of the main category. 
ATS : Amphetamine Type Substances (Amphetamine and Methamphetamine) 
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3.2. Shipping countries 
On Evolution, vendors may inform on the shipping country and destination(s) of their products by selecting 
countries/regions from a preset list. According to our dataset, 93 shipping countries and 164 shipping destinations have been 
mentioned (see Appendix 2 Table B1). On a given sale proposal, vendors always mentioned one shipping country only, 
while a list of destination countries was sometimes stated. Vendors may manage several listings. A combined study of 
vendor usernames and shipping countries shows that vendors may state different shipping countries between their sale 
proposals, even though they mostly mention only one shipping country (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Number of vendors mentioning one or more shipping countries in their sale proposals 
 
An analysis of the frequency of shipping countries indicates that “Worldwide” was mentioned by close to 50% of all vendors 
and stated in close to 40% of all listings. The predominance of this statement may be seen as a limitation for a valid 
assessment of the trafficking magnitude of specific countries when analysing the global market. Indeed, this high proportion 
implies that we may underestimate the position of a specific country in the market. However, we may also assume that 
vendors from any country may choose to indicate “Worldwide”. In this case, the proportions may be quite accurate. 
Interestingly, stating “Worldwide” depends on the nature of the product proposed by vendors, as shown in Table 2. There 
is a clear division between digital and physical products. For instance, hacking services or material related to financial fraud 
(“Fraud related” category), manuals (“Guides and tutorials”) and scans of IDs or legitimation documents (“ID related”) are 
digital products. Instead, counterfeit goods (“Goods, currencies and precious metals”), chemicals (“Lab supplies and 
paraphernalia”) or any type of drugs (“Prescription drugs and medicines, PIED and Illicit drugs”) are physical. The origin 
country does not represent a meaningful information for digital goods that are sent through the Internet, which may explain 
the high proportion of vendors selecting “Worldwide” as the shipping country. To the contrary, the delivery mode of physical 
material makes it possible to check the coherence between the origin country stated online and that written down on the 
postal parcel. Therefore, vendors may not have interest to provide incorrect information since customers may leave negative 
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feedbacks in the case of inaccurate data [8]. This would explain why vendors mainly provide a meaningful shipping country 
when offering physical products and do not utilise the “Worldwide” statement. Vendors still stating their physical products 
as shipped from “Worldwide” may like to conceal the true origin of their merchandise or they prefer to provide details in 
the description part of the listing. Thus, the spatial analysis of trafficking on cryptomarkets is particularly meaningful in the 
case of physical products and to a lesser extent for digital products. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Listings and vendors’ proportions where “Worldwide” was mentioned as the origin country for each 
product category 
 
Table 3. Proportion of listings and vendors for the shipping countries having at least 1% of the total number of listings 
* : Since vendors may mention different shipping countries between their listings, the sum of percentages is higher than 
100%. 
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Without considering “Worldwide”, the analysis of the stated origin countries shows the dominant position of English 
speaking countries (the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia) and Western European countries (Germany and 
Netherlands) which was also observed in [20] (see Table 3). Although since 2013, several non-English language markets 
have appeared, English seems to remain the dominant language. This might be a result of the central position of English-
speaking countries in online trades or the fact that English is usually the trading language which might deter non-English 
vendors from offering goods [20]. It is worth noting that while some countries have similar proportions of both listings and 
vendors (the United Kingdom, Germany or Sweden, for instance), the listing proportions of China & Hong Kong are three 
times higher than their respective vendor proportions. This clearly reveals a specificity of their market structure: a few 
vendors are involved but they manage a large number of listings. Since each listing may be purchased several times by 
customers, this result may indicate that vendors have stock and thus have access to a steady long-term supply of the products 
they offer. The small number of Chinese vendors may be explained by the very strict control of China’s Internet traffic [24]. 
In addition, trafficking on online darknet platforms might not be considered as effective for Chinese vendors for various 
reasons. Indeed, the registration process on the darknet markets (e.g. fees, access constraints, etc.) may be considered by 
Chinese vendors as too restrictive, urging them to adopt other ways of distribution such as dedicated websites on the clear 
web. Thus, the clear web may be the main reason explaining the relatively minor position of the Chinese market on the 
darknet, since it represents an efficient method for the distribution of products in which Chinese vendors specialise, as it 
will be discussed further below (see sections 3.4 to 3.6). 234 
 
3.3. Trafficking flows 
A combined analysis of shipping countries and destinations was performed to evaluate the nature of trafficking for the main 
countries (see Figure 2). First, Figure 2 clearly shows the distinction between physical (e.g. illicit drugs) and digital (e.g. ID 
related) goods discussed above. The “Worldwide” origin is much more mentioned for ID related goods than for illicit drugs 
(see Table 2 and Figure 2). 
In addition, such analysis reveals the behaviour of vendors and the market dynamics for each country, and reciprocally. 
Interestingly, the flow of illicit drugs is essentially domestic in Australia (i.e. Australian sellers only propose products to 
customers living within the country) or mainly in the United States. The domestic pattern may be explained by the intent of 
both customers and vendors to reduce their risks (such as parcel loss, interception by authorities or arrest) by selling or 
purchasing only within their country of residence [25]. Accordingly, Kruithof et al. [20] mentioned that many vendors 
appear to be reluctant to ship to countries with stricter law enforcement and border controls such as Finland, Australia, the 
United States and Canada. By contrast, Germany, Canada and the Netherlands mainly export internationally. This may be 
related to the role of these countries in the production of synthetic drugs, such as Ecstasy & MDMA and amphetamines (see 
section 3.5) [26,27]. In the same line, a relative easy access to illicit drugs in the domestic market would not stimulate local 
users to purchase substances on cryptomarkets and would motivate sellers to export to foreign customers [25]. A more 
competitive domestic market from vendors’ point of view would have the same consequence. The analysis of trafficking 
flows also helps to understand and explain the offer patterns. For instance, if a domestic market is observed, we may expect 
good correlation between the types and frequencies of products offered and the prevalence data of the local population (or 
at least, the sub-population sourcing drugs on cryptomarkets) (see section 3.5). 
In an intelligence perspective, the identification of an important domestic market such as the one in Australia or the United 
States may encourage a tighter control of mails inside the country. The determination of the main countries that export 
internationally (e.g. China, the Netherlands or Germany) may help to target posts from these specific countries. Furthermore, 
combining the trafficking flows information to the types of good and the concealment methods indicated by sellers online, 
which tends to match that of the delivered packages [19], may be of added value and could help targeting specific types of 
packages from specific countries. 
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Figure 2. Structure of trafficking considering the whole market (left) and two categories of physical (top right) and virtual 
products (bottom right). The circular plot shows the directional flows (origin and destination) of products for the most 
frequent couples of origin and destination countries (i.e. couples having a frequency of at least 1% in relation to the total 
number of existing combinations)5 
3.4.Spatial specificity 
To evaluate the specialisation of vendors from any country and their respective importance in the trafficking of products, 
the distribution of listings and vendors for every country was analysed (Figures 3 and 4) as well as their contribution to the 
total number of listings for each product category (Figure 5). For instance, Figure 3 indicates that illicit drugs and 
prescription drugs 
represent respectively 66.3% and 18.5% of all listings (when worldwide is excluded). We also observe that 64% and 6.5% 
of the listings “from” respectively American and Indian vendors concern illicit drugs. They are respectively managed by 
710 and 8 vendors (see Figure 4). Lastly, the analysis of Figure 5 shows that the United States accounts for 30% of all sale 
proposals on Evolution (worldwide excluded). Moreover, vendors from the United States - in line with their number (see 
Figure 4) - are the main contributors on Evolution since they dominate the distribution of illicit drugs (29.2% of listings 
classified in the category are managed by “American” vendors), prescription drugs (41.6%), fraud related (30.4%), lab 
supplies (48.1%) and ID Related (59.1%). 
 
 
5 The origins and destinations of products are represented by the circle’s segments. A specific color is assigned to 
the flows and circle’s segments of a particular country. The size of the flow is indicated by the width of the link 
and its basis. The direction of the flow is encoded both by the origin color and by the gap between link and circle 
segment at the destination. The direction goes from a non-gap to a gap. Listings with unstated shipping 
destinations were removed from the analysis (n = 40,851). 
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Figure 3. Distribution of listings in product categories for every shipping country (without considering the worldwide 
statement). * Country with less than 1% of the total number of listings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of vendors for each shipping country and product categories. 
* Country with less than 1% of the total number of listings 
Figures 3 and 4 highlight the specialisation in prescription and illicit drugs of vendors from the Netherlands (98% of listings 
and 93% of vendors), Canada (97% each), Spain (96% and 94%) or Sweden (94% each). The specialisation of ‘Dutch 
vendors’ has also been observed by a study based on more recent datasets that concluded that they use cryptomarkets almost 
exclusively for drug sales and particularly ecstasy-type drugs and stimulants [20]. The specialisation of Indian vendors in 
the distribution of prescription drugs (see Figure 3) is also worth to be highlighted, especially when considering the small 
number of vendors they represent, compared to that of the other countries present in the category (see Figures 4 and 5). This 
was also observed on the cryptomarket Agora [9]. By contrast, sellers ‘from’ Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom or 
the United States seem to diversify their activities. In line with their number of vendors (see Table 3) they are predominant 
in each of all categories (Figure 4), which is also corroborated by the study of the origin of listings for each category (Figure 
5). In fact, these four countries together dominate the distribution of products in the majority of categories, such as illicit 
drugs (about 77% relative to the total number of listings of the category), prescription drugs (73%), PIEDs (63%), fraud 
related (77%), lab supplies (86%), firearms (71%) and ID related (86%). ‘Guides and Tutorials’ and “Goods, currencies and 
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precious metals” are the only two categories where vendors from these countries are not predominant. “Guides and 
Tutorials” has been flooded by one Belgian vendor who is responsible of 68% of listings in the category. 
 
Figure 5. Contribution (in terms of listing proportions) of each shipping country in product categories (without 
considering the worldwide statement). * Country with less than 1% of the total number of listings 
 
The “Goods, currencies and precious metals” category seems to be controlled by Chinese vendors (71.8% of the listings, 
see Figure 5), while their number (13) is lower than other countries present in the category such as the United States (67), 
the United Kingdom (31), Germany (17) and Australia (16) (see Figure 4). In particular, they manage almost 99% of all 
listings classified as “Luxury goods”, which mainly consist in watches & jewellery, and 85% of that classified as “Clothes 
and accessories”. Most of the listing titles mention luxury brands, contain the term “replica” and are sold at cheap prices. 
For instance, concerning watches (n = 1’347 listings), Rolex is the most proposed brand (n = 314) followed by Omega (n = 
217), Emporio Armani (n = 197), Breitling (n = 172) and Audemars Piguet (n = 149) and their prices range from 50 to 200 
USD. Overall, all watch brands but one (Emporio Armani collection of the Giorgio Armani industry) are affiliated to the 
Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry (FH), according to its official website6. These results are consistent with the few 
sources of information regarding the trafficking of luxury goods [28]. 
The evaluation of the impact of countries in the trafficking of specific products as well as their role in the distribution chain 
was found to be particularly relevant in the case of illicit drugs and is therefore developed in the following section. Indeed, 
they represent the main good offered (see Table 1) as well as the category where Worldwide is less stated (see Table 2 and 
Figure 2). 
3.5. Illicit drugs 
As mentioned in the introduction, English-speaking countries (e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia) and 
Western European countries (e.g. the Netherlands) dominates the trafficking of illicit drugs on cryptomarkets while 
cannabis, stimulants (cocaine and amphetamines), ecstasy (MDMA) and psychedelics (NPS, LSD) are the main drugs 
offered on cryptomarkets. In addition, compared to the traditional market, the relative low offer and purchase of substances 
such as cocaine and heroin was noted by Kruithof et al. (2016). This may be the consequence of the predominance of 
recreational consumers or psychonauts on cryptomarkets [14,29,30]. The elements of planning and having to wait for 
delivery which characterised cryptomarkets might deter excessive consumers or the ones not able to plan their consumption 
[12,20]. This may be the case of regular cocaine and heroin consumers, which may have timely access to their substances 
through traditional means of supply (street dealer, contacts). These observations are further emphasised in our study (see 
Figures 6-8).  
Similarly to the previous section, Figures 6, 7 and 8 provide information about the distribution of illicit drug listings and 
vendors for every country (Figures 6 and 7) and their contribution to the total number of listings for each category of illicit 
drugs (Figure 8).   
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Figure 6. Distribution of illicit drug listings for every shipping country (without considering the worldwide statement).  
* Country with less than 2% of the total number of illicit drugs listings 
 
Figure 7. Number of vendors for each shipping country and categories of illicit drugs. 
* Country with less than 2% of the total number of listings 
Most countries propose cannabis related products which is also the illicit drug mainly offered (38.6%) of all illicit drug 
listings (see Figures 6 and 7). In addition to the adaptation to the customer demand, the predominance of cannabis may be 
explained by the easy access to cannabis. Indeed, cannabis is not only the most consumed drug worldwide, it also represents 
the most widely cultivated drug crop according to the UNODC [26]. Among the main stated countries, Australia, China and 
the Netherlands are the only ones that do not mainly propose cannabis. For instance, vendors from Australia propose at 
similar frequencies Ecstasy & MDMA, cannabis and methamphetamine, which is tightly related to the indicators of the 
traditional market (arrests, seizures and prevalence data) according to the Australian Intelligence Crime Commission [31]. 
We may reasonably assume that such trend is the consequence of the domestic pattern observed for the Australian illicit 
drug trafficking (see Figure 2). Lastly, the high proportions of listings of Ecstasy & MDMA and amphetamine from Dutch 
vendors, and to a lesser extent from German vendors (see Figure 6), can be explained by the main role these countries play 
in the production of such drugs [27]. As shown in Figure 8, together they cover more than half of the sale proposals of both 
Ecstasy & MDMA (50.7% of all listings in the category) and amphetamine (56.8%). Concerning Ecstasy & MDMA, while 
production is now global, Europe, in particular the Netherlands, is considered as the world’s leading source of the drug [32]. 
Clear spatial specificity can be observed for amphetamines, which are mainly proposed by Germany, the Netherlands and 
even Sweden (Figure 6) and methamphetamine, which is mainly offered by Australia and the United States. 
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Figure 8. Contribution (in terms of listing proportions) of each shipping country in illicit drug categories (without 
considering the worldwide statement). * Country with less than 2% of the total number of illicit drugs listings 
Amphetamine is still mainly produced in Europe while methamphetamine production is limited to the Baltic region and 
Central European countries. Moreover, the use of methamphetamine in Europe is limited compared to that of amphetamine 
and is restricted to a group of geographically close countries [33]. By contrast, as noted in the last World Drug Report [26], 
« although methamphetamine is a feature of ATS markets worldwide, it is particularly dominant in East and South-East 
Asia and North America ». In Australia, methamphetamine remains the main drug produced in clandestine laboratories 
detected [31]. Finally, the United States are responsible for the main proportion of illicit drug listings (29%), concentrate 
the largest number of vendors (more than twice that of the United Kingdom) and is the lead country of a wide number of 
illicit drug categories (see Figure 8). For instance, its leadership in the opioids category may be explained by the increase in 
heroin use in North America in the past decade (high prevalence compared to the worldwide mean). In contrast, Western 
and Central Europe have seen stable or declining long-term trends of heroin consumption since the late 1990s [26]. Finally, 
Chinese vendors, while five times fewer in number than Americans, lead the NPS category (27.7% of NPS listings). As 
further developed below, they specialise in the distribution of NPS (see also Figures 6 and 7), in which they play a strategic 
role. Another interesting observation is the non-existence of cocaine and heroin producing countries (e.g. South American 
countries or Middle East/South East/South West Asia). In general, these countries do not have access to the same 
technological infrastructure (e.g. the Internet, secure mail system) as westernised countries [7,18]. Furthermore, 
cryptomarkets may not represent a relevant distribution channel between producers and retailers in the case of cocaine and 
heroin. 
3.6. A specific analysis of New Psychoactive Substances 
Regarding the worldwide market, 363 vendors manage 3,936 listings classified in NPS (all three NPS related categories 
grouped). This represents almost 11% of the illicit drugs category (see Figure 8). As shown in Table 3, listings about illicit 
drugs shipped from China and Hong Kong represent about 4% of the total number of listings proposed on Evolution. 
However, the majority of their illicit drug listings concern new psychoactive substances (93% precisely, see Figure 6). 
They cover almost 28% of all the NPS listings proposed on Evolution with only 22 vendors, which makes it the lead country, 
followed by the United States (26.5% - 115 vendors) and the United Kingdom (13.9% - 83 vendors) (see Figure 8). The 
combined analysis of masses and prices of the NPS proposed reveals geographical differences between the shipping 
countries (see Figure 8).  
Most countries are characterised by a majority of listings offering small quantities of NPS (less than one gram or less than 
ten grams). However, vendors from China and Hong Kong offer larger quantities of NPS, between 10g and 100g, or even 
more. Thus, we may assume that vendors from China have the capacity to provide bulk quantities. Indeed, typical quantities 
for NPS consumption are usually very low, suggesting that quantities over 100g may already be considered as bulk. Price 
ranges also corroborate this finding. Listings offered for sale from China and Hong Kong show a median price lower than 
10 USD per gram, while median prices are relatively higher for every other country. Of course, vendors usually propose 
 Broséus et al. / Forensic Science International (2017) 13 
 
 
 
products at prices decreasing gradually when quantity increases. However, Chinese vendors are able to offer a lot of listings 
at high quantities at competitive prices in comparison to vendors from other countries. In conclusion, these results may 
indicate that Chinese vendors have easily access to these products or even may be involved in their production which would 
be in agreement with Smith & Garlich (2013) who stated that China played an active role in the domestic production of NPS 
[34]. Furthermore, this analysis corroborates the statements of vendors on their profiles concerning their ability to offer both 
small and very large quantities of NPS at lower prices  
 
The importance of Chinese sellers in NPS production or distribution does not seem to be cryptomarket specific. Indeed, 
recent researches studying country specific differences in substance availability on the Agora cryptomarket found that China, 
despite a small number of sellers, was overrepresented in NPS. Using only the number of listings and sellers to draw their 
conclusions, the authors mentioned that China was probably involved in the production of NPS [8,9]. Another study, 
investigating wholesale activity on cryptomarkets, found that wholesale transactions were especially concentrated in China. 
According to the authors, this may be related to the role of China in the production of these substances [18]. Regarding NPS 
in general, or more specifically synthetic cannabinoids, China has always been suspected of being the place where these 
products are synthesised since the first appearance of “spice” products in 2004 [34–37]. It was also suggested that some 
substances are sent to Europe, or even North America, and then reconditioned for retail shipping [35]. On the clear web, 
China was also mentioned as the country of origin of websites offering MT-45, an opioid-like substance often referred to as 
a NPS [38]. However, this was not investigated further, for example by performing controlled purchases. Meyers and al. 
[39] also noted the accessibility of purchasing cathinones (a major class of NPS) on the clear web. They highlighted United 
States, together with Germany and the United Kingdom, as the three main countries where retailing websites were hosted. 
Concerning NPS shipments confiscated at borders, most cathinones seizures in 2009 in New Zealand originated from the 
United Kingdom or directly from China [40]. In Australia, in the period 2013 – 2014, NPS in kilogram quantities came 
primarily from China [41]. Thus, although based on only one cryptomarket, the results obtained through our study support 
various assumptions regarding the position of China within the NPS market.  
 
.  
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Figure 8. Proportions of listings (%) and median prices per gram (USD) according to the shipping country and the 
quantity proposed. The global median price per gram is mentioned into brackets along with the number of listings for 
each shipping country. Only the main shipping countries proposing NPS are represented. 
 
4. General discussion and conclusion 
Through the analysis of a dataset containing information on 4,171 vendors and 92,980 sale proposals, this study aimed first 
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at investigating the type and proportions of products offered for sale on Evolution, a popular darknet marketplace in 2014-
2015. Then, this article studied the trafficking flows and geographical specificities in the trafficking of the different types 
of products, in particular illicit drugs. Finally, NPS were especially studied to show how digital data can inform on the role 
of specific countries in the distribution chain of products.  
The results illustrate that the trafficking on Evolution is mainly devoted to the trade of illicit drugs. These substances 
represent 46% of all listings and 57% of vendors offer for sale at least one product classified as illicit drugs. Nevertheless, 
a wide range of other illicit products or services are offered as well. In particular, sale proposals related to various fraud 
issues (carding, ID theft, counterfeit goods, etc.) represent almost a third of the total number of listings and close to half of 
vendors propose products classified in this category. The spatial analysis we performed showed that English-speaking 
countries (especially the United States but also the United Kingdom and Australia) and Western European countries (the 
Netherlands, Germany) dominate the market, which is in line with past and more recent studies carried out on other 
cryptomarkets [8,10,11,16,20]. The study of trafficking flows reveals the domestic (e.g. Australia) and international (e.g. 
the Netherlands, Germany and China) nature of the trade of some countries. The spatial analysis also shows the specialisation 
of vendors and which countries are at the forefront of the distribution of specific types of products. For instance, vendors 
from the Netherlands and Canada specialise in trafficking prescription and illicit drugs, Indian vendors in prescription drugs, 
Chinese vendors specialise in luxury goods and NPS, while vendors from the United States dominate in a wide range of 
product categories. The combination of our results and other sources of information shows that geographical trends in the 
trafficking of specific type of illicit drugs tend to reflect the structure of the traditional market (e.g. prevalence data and role 
in the production of synthetic drugs). This may corroborate that sellers use cryptomarkets as a new distribution channel to 
sell all or part of their merchandise.  
Nevertheless, the analysis of the number of vendors and sale proposals performed provides only information on the supply 
side of the market. To properly evaluate the role of countries on Evolution, as well as that of cryptomarkets in the distribution 
chain, it would be interesting to get an insight into the volume of sales of each country using the feedbacks left by past 
customers [2,11]. This would also better inform on the availability of the products offered for sale [18]. Unfortunately, the 
way data on Evolution were collected did not make possible such analysis. The data collected online, and used by researchers 
to evaluate different aspects of the trade on cryptomarkets - such as the vendor name, type of product, quantity, price, 
shipping country and destination(s) - are uncertain. Indeed, they depend on what the sellers state on their sale proposals and 
profiles. The only viable way to verify the accuracy of the online information is to purchase and evaluate a product [19,42]. 
However, an incoherence between the stated online information and that of the physical product shipped by post could have 
a negative impact on the reputation of the seller and consequently on his revenue [8]. A previous study showed that sellers 
seem to describe accurately their sale proposals, in particular their origin country and products offered for sale [14]. Indeed, 
customers can easily verify the country of origin of the purchased product, when they received it by mail since it is stated 
on mails shipped internationally [8]. Thus, even if the possibility exists that sellers do not provide accurate information, it 
seems unlikely that they do so in regards to the shipping country and the products offered for sale [8,18,25]. In addition, the 
stated origin country tends to be accurate, as evidenced by studies based on darknet orders [19], seizures of postal parcels 
at the borders [43] and coherence between online information and knowledge regarding the offline market [8,9].  
In conclusion, the analysis of cryptomarkets should be integrated in a more global approach that aims to improve the 
knowledge of illicit market structures and trafficking, which is in line with a forensic intelligence approach. Developing 
strategies to monitor Internet activities on cryptomarkets and on dedicated forums are powerful means to observe and detect 
global and specific trends for different categories of products on the illicit market. This research demonstrates the importance 
of analysing all the data available on a cryptomarket to inform on the structure (e.g. type and frequencies of products, number 
of vendors, shipping countries and destinations, etc.) and dynamics (e.g. trafficking flows, emerging substances, specific 
trends, etc.) of the trade as well as on the role of certain countries in the trafficking and even specificities of their illicit 
market. In addition, our observations validate the hypothesis that the use of the shipping country statement truly inform on 
the origin of the products offered for sale. Performing a geographical analysis of trafficking on darknet marketplaces based 
on such statement can therefore be considered as appropriate. Since monitoring cryptomarkets may reveal country-specific 
trends, it could be seen as a new data source that would inform from a different perspective on the characteristics of the 
illicit market within the domestic context of particular countries. This would be particularly meaningful in the case of 
physical products such as (illicit) drugs. The knowledge obtained through this analysis could then be used at a tactical and 
operational level (e.g. to support specific operations) or at a strategic level (e.g. to obtain an understanding of the criminal 
activity) [44]. 
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Appendix 1 
On Evolution, product categories are typically self-selected by vendors from an existing list when creating a sale proposal, 
which is a source of uncertainty. Indeed, category names administrators had chosen did not inform on the type of products 
that was actually proposed. For instance, most of the illicit drugs or medicines categories were not defined according to the 
chemical structure of the products but instead to their effects. Moreover, it was not rare that vendors misclassified their 
listings. Furthermore, categories that were defined by administrators were not necessarily coherent considering the diversity 
in the type of products they contained. Lastly, it was possible to merge in the same category several listings spread into 
different categories since they concerned the same type of fraud issue or illicit activity (see Figs. A1 and A2). Thus, sale 
proposals were semi-automatically classified according to a list of keywords that we defined after a thorough analysis of all 
the listing titles. The new classification was performed according to the type of products offered for sale or to the nature of 
the illicit activity involved and included three main categories, in particular “Illicit drugs, drugs and paraphernalia”, “Various 
fraud issues” and “Other”. In a few words, listings originally classified in “Drugs” were reorganised in a number of 
categories in “Illicit drugs, drugs and paraphernalia” according to the general type of licit or illicit drug or equipment offered. 
In particular, apart from the usual illicit drugs (e.g. cannabis, cocaine, opioids, ecstasy, LSD), the products known as new 
psychoactive substances (NPS) were distributed between three subcategories. The four major classes – phenethylamines, 
cathinones, piperazines and tryptamines [46] – were listed as “NPS”. Their classification is based on the general chemical 
structure, shared by every substance of each category. Synthetic cannabinoids were classified separately since they may 
include herbal components and synthetic substances [47]. Sub-stances not included in the two previous subcategories – due 
to a complex or anecdotal chemical characterization – were classified as “NPS—Other”. It includes for example benzofurans 
(e.g. 5-APB, 6- EAPB) or aminoindane analogues (e.g. MDAI) (see Fig. A2). Ketamine was classified in “Other”. In the 
“Various fraud issues” category, a significant proportion of the listings are part of the “Fraud Related” category. The latter 
mainly concerns listings on financial fraud and hacking services. In particular, most of the listings are related to carding. 
We also defined the “Goods, currencies and precious metals” category, which especially contains “Luxury goods” (mostly 
watches followed by jewellery and perfumes) and “Clothes and accessories” (mainly glasses, shirts, jackets and bags). These 
two categories contain products with a high probability of forgeries, as will be discussed below. The “Various fraud issues” 
also includes sale proposals about material related to identity theft such as false or stolen ID documents as well as data 
related to identity (“ID Related”). Moreover, a variety of electronic documents explaining how to perform some hacking or 
fraud related activities were listed as “Guides & Tutorials”. To a lesser extent, a number of sale proposals concern “Firearms 
& Weapons”, which is essentially constituted by the original “Weapons” category. Lastly, customers may request a specific 
listing from a vendor through private messaging [11]. A listing specifically designed for the customer will then be created, 
without necessarily stating the concerned product. They were classified in the “Custom listings” category if their title did 
not include any relevant keyword that may be used for classification in one aforementioned category (see Fig. A2). 
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Appendix 1 Figure A1. Categories of products as created by administrators of Evolution 
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Appendix 1 Figure A2. Classification of sale proposals performed by the authors 
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Appendix 2 
 
Information Occurrence Countries & regions mentioned 
Shipping country 93 Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cayman  Islands, Central African Republic, 
Chile, China, Christmas Island, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guernsey, Hong Kong SAR China, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Svalbard and Jan Mayen, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda,   
Ukraine,   United   Kingdom,   United   States,  Uruguay, Western Sahara, 
Worldwide, Yemen, Zimbabwe. 
Shipping destination 164 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Anguilla, 
Antarctica, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, 
Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Bouvet Island, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Canton and Enderbury Islands, Cape Verde, 
Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Christmas 
Island, Cocos [Keeling] Islands, Colombia, Comoros, Congo—Brazzaville, 
Congo—Kinshasa, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Dronning Maud Land, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Falkland Islands, Faroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, France, French 
Guiana, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, 
Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guam, Guatemala, 
Guernsey, Hong Kong SAR China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau SAR China, Macedonia, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Metropolitan France, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, North 
Korea, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto 
Rico, Romania, Russia, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Svalbard and Jan 
Mayen, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Vatican City, Venezuela, Vietnam, Worldwide, Zimbabwe. 
Appendix 2 Table B1 Shipping countries and destinations mentioned by vendors 
 
 
  
 Broséus et al. / Forensic Science International (2017) 20 
 
 
 
References 
[1] EUROPOL. Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA), The Hague, The Netherlands, 
2016. 
[2] J. Aldridge, D. Décary-Hétu. Not an “Ebay for Drugs”: The Cryptomarket “Silk Road” as a Paradigm 
Shifting Criminal Innovation. Soc. Sci. Res. Netw., 2014. 
[3] M. Tzanetakis, G. Kamphausen, B. Werse, R. Von Laufenberg. The transparency paradox. Building 
trust, resolving disputes and optimising logistics on conventional and online drugs markets. Int. J. Drug 
Policy, 2016, 35, 58–68. 
[4] A. AlQahtani, E. El-Alfy. Anonymous connections based on onion routing: a review and a  
visualization tool. Procedia Comput. Sci., 2015, 52, 121–128. 
[5] F. Reid, M. Harrigan. An analysis of anonymity in the bitcoin system, in Proc. Int. Conf. Privacy, 
Secur. Risk Trust Int. Conf. Soc. Comput., Boston, USA, 2011, pp. 1318–1326. 
[6] J. Cox. Staying in the shadows: the use of bitcoin and encryption in cryptomarkets. 2016, The internet 
and drug markets, 41–47. 
[7] J. Martin. Lost on the Silk Road: Online drug distribution and the “cryptomarket.” Criminol. Crim. 
Justice, 2014, 14, 351–367. 
[8] J. Van Buskirk, S. Naicker, A. Roxburgh, R. Bruno, L. Burns. Who sells what? Country specific 
differences in substance availability on the Agora cryptomarket. Int. J. Drug Policy, 2016, 35, 16–23. 
[9] D. S. Dolliver, S. P. Ericson, K. L. Love. A Geographic Analysis of Drug Trafficking 572 Patterns 
on the TOR Network. Geogr. Rev., 2016, 1–24. 
[10] N. Christin. Traveling the Silk Road: A measurement analysis of a large anonymous online 
marketplace. Proc. 22nd Int. World Wide Web Conf., 2012, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
[11] K. Soska, N. Christin. Measuring the Longitudinal Evolution of the Online Anonymous Marketplace 
Ecosystem, in Proc. 22nd USENIX Secur. Symp. (USENIX Secur. 2015), Washington, DC., 2015, pp. 
33–48. 
[12] M. C. Van Hout, T. Bingham. “Surfing the Silk Road”: A study of users’ experiences. Int. J. Drug 
Policy, 2013, 24, 524–529. 
[13] M. C. Van Hout, T. Bingham. “Silk Road”, the virtual drug 581 marketplace: A single case study of 
user experiences. Int. J. Drug Policy, 2013, 24, 385–391. 
[14] M. C. Van Hout, T. Bingham. Responsible vendors, intelligent consumers: Silk Road, the online 
revolution in drug trading. Int. J. Drug Policy, 2014, 25, 183–189. 
[15] M. J. Barratt, J. A. Ferris, A. R. Winstock. Use of Silk Road, the online drug marketplace, in the 
United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. Addiction, 2014, 109, 774–783. 
[16] M. J. Barratt, J. A. Ferris, A. R. Winstock. Safer scoring? Cryptomarkets, social supply and drug 
market violence. Int. J. Drug Policy, 2016, 35, 24–31. 
[17] J. Broséus, D. Rhumorbarbe, C. Mireault, V. Ouellette, F. Crispino, D. Décary-Hétu. Studying illicit 
drug trafficking on Darknet markets: Structure and organisation from a 591 Canadian perspective. 
Forensic Sci. Int., 2016, 264, DOI 10.1016/j.forsciint.2016.02.045. 
 Broséus et al. / Forensic Science International (2017) 21 
 
 
 
[18] J. Aldridge, D. Décary-Hétu. Hidden wholesale: The drug diffusing capacity of online drug 
cryptomarkets. Int. J. Drug Policy, 2016, 35, 7–15. 
[19] D. Rhumorbarbe, L. Staehli, J. Broséus, Q. Rossy, P. Esseiva. Buying drugs on a Darknet market: 
A better deal? Studying the online illicit drug market through the analysis of digital, physical and 
chemical data. Forensic Sci. Int., 2016, 267, 173-182. 
[20] K. Kruithof, J. Aldridge, D. Décary-Hétu, M. Sim, E. Dujso, S. Hoorens. Internet-Facilitated Drugs 
Trade: An Analysis of the Size, Scope and the Role of the Netherlands. RAND EUROPE, 2016. 
[21] J. Van Buskirk, A. Roxburgh, R. Bruno, L. Burns. Drugs and the Internet, 2015.  
[22] J. Demant, R. Munksgaard, E. Houborg. Personal use, social supply or redistribution? cryptomarket 
demand on Silk Road 2 and Agora. Trends Organ. Crime, 2016, 1–20. 
[23] R-Core-Team. R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Found. Stat. Comput., 
2016. 
[24] R. Ensafi, P. Winter, A. Mueen, J. R. Crandall. Analyzing the Great Firewall of China Over Space 
and Time. Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol., 2015, 2015, 61–76. 
[25] D. Décary-Hétu, M. Paquet-Clouston, J. Aldridge. Going international? Risk taking by cryptomarket 
drug vendors. Int. J. Drug Policy, 2016, 35, 69–76. 
[26] UNODC. World Drug Report, United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime, Vienna, 2016. 
[27] EMCDDA. Rapport Sur Les Marchés 611 Des Drogues Dans l’UE: Synthèse, Publications 
Conjointes de l’EMCDDA et d’Europol, Office Des Publications de l’Union Européenne, Luxembourg., 
2016. 
[28] Europol and the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market. Situation Report on Counterfeiting 
in the European Union, 2015. 
[29] E. Ormsby. Silk Road: insights from interviews with users and vendors. In “The Internet and drug 
markets,” (Ed: EMCDDA), Publications Office Of The European Union, Lisbonne, Portugal, 2016. 
[30] M. J. Barratt. Silk Road : eBay for Drugs. Addiction, 2012, 107, 683.  
[31] ACIC. Report, 2014-2015 Illicit Drug Data, 2016. 
[32] UNODC. Ecstasy and Amphetamines Global Survey, Vienna, 2003. 
[33] EMCDDA, EUROPOL. EU Drugs Market Report : A Strategic Analysis, European Monitoring 
Centre For Drugs And Drug AddictionEuropean Police Office, Luxembourg, 2013. 
[34] S. Smith, F. Garlich. Availability and supply of novel psychoactive substances, in Nov. Psychoact. 
Subst., (Eds: P. Dargan, D.M. Wood), Elsevier Academic Press, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2013. 
[35] EMCDDA. New Psychoactive Substances in Europe. An Update from the EU Early Warning System 
(March 2015)., Publications Office Of The European Union, Luxembourg, 2015. 
[36] I. Bigdeli, O. Corazza, Z. Aslanpour, F. Schifano. Novel Psychoactive Substances (NPS): a study 
on Persian language websites. Iran J. Public Heal., 2013, 42, 511–515.  
[37] ACMD. Consideration of the Novel Psychoactive Substances (’Legal Highs’), Home 634 Office, 
Londres, 2011. 
 Broséus et al. / Forensic Science International (2017) 22 
 
 
 
[38] S. Siddiqi, C. Verney, P. Dargan, D. M. Wood. Understanding the availability, prevalence of use, 
desired effects, acute toxicity and dependence potential of the novel opioid MT-45. Clin. Toxicol., 2015, 
53, 54–59. 
[39] K. Meyers, Ö. Kaynak, E. Bresani, B. Curtis, A. McNamara, K. Brownfield, K. Kirby. The 
availability and depiction of synthetic cathinones (bath salts) on the Internet: do online suppliers employ 
features to maximize purchases? Int. J. Drug Policy, 2015, 26, 670–674. 
[40] INCB. Report of the International 641 Narcotics Control Board for 2010., International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB). 2011, United Nations, New York, NY, 2011. 
[41] ACIC. 2013-2014 Illicit Drug Data Report, Australian Intelligence Crime Commission. 2014, 
Canberra, Australia, 2015. 
[42] F. Caudevilla, M. Ventura, I. Fornís, M. J. Barratt, C. Vidal, C. G. Lladanosa, P. Quintana, A. 
Muñoz, N. Calzada. Results of an international drug testing service for cryptomarket users. Int. J. Drug 
Policy, 2016, 35, 38–41. 
[43] N. Horne, K. Edmondson, M. Harrison, B. Scott. The applied use of forensic intelligence for 
community and organised crime. Aust. J. Forensic Sci., 2015, 47, 72–82. 
[44] M. Morelato, S. Baechler, O. Ribaux, A. Beavis, M. Tahtouh, P. Kirkbride, C. Roux, P. Margot. 
Forensic intelligence framework-Part I: Induction of a transversal model by comparing illicit drugs and 
false identity documents monitoring. Forensic Sci. Int., 2014, 236, 181–190. 
[45] L. A. King. Legal classification of novel psychoactive substances - An international 655 comparison  
in Nov. Psychoact. Subst. Classif. Pharmacol. Toxicol., (Eds: P.I. Dargan, D.M. Wood), 
Elsevier/Academic Press, London ; Waltham, MA, 2013, pp. 3–27. 
[46] I. Vardakou, C. Pistos, C. Spiliopoulou. Spice drugs as a new trend: Mode of action, identification 
and legislation. Toxicol. Lett., 2010, 197, 157–162. 
